FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET FOIA 1363182-0

Total Withheld Page(s) = 40

Bates Page	Reason for Withholding
Reference	(i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI (16cv2531)-34 through FBI (16cv2531)-57	DUPLICATE
FBI (16cv2531)-106 through FBI (16cv2531)- 110	DUPLICATE
FBI (16cv2531)-117 through FBI (16cv2531)- 127	DUPLICATE

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X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washinoton, D.C. 2023

October 28, 2016

Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary

Honorable Richard Shelby Chairman Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies

Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary

Honorable John Culberson Chairman Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies

Honorable Jason Chaffetz Chairman. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Dear Messrs Chairmen:

In previous congressional testimony, I referred to the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had completed its investigation of former Secretary Clinton's personal email server. Due to recent developments, I am writing to supplement my previous testimony.

In connection with an unrelated ease, the FBI has learned of the existence of emails that appear to be pertinent to the investigation. I am writing to inform you that the investigative team briefed me on this yesterday, and I agreed that the FBI should take appropriate investigative steps designed to allow investigators to review these emails to determine whether they contain classified information, as well as to assess their importance to our investigation.

Although the FBI cannot yet assess whether or not this material may be significant, and I cannot predict how long it will take us to complete this additional work, I believe it is important to update your Committees about our efforts in light of my previous testimony.

Sincerely yours,

- Honorable Dianne Feinstein
 Vice Chairman
 Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- Honorable Patrick J, Leahy Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- Honorable Barbara Mikulski
 Ranking Member
 Committee on Appropriations
 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- 1 Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member
 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- 1 Honorable Adam B. Schiff Ranking Member Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
- Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- Honorable Michael Honda
 Ranking Member
 Committee on Appropriations
 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
 and Related Agencies
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

1 - Honorable Elijah E. Cummings Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 2053S

November 6, 2016

Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence

Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary

Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science and Related Agencies

Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Servity and
Governmental Affairs

Dear Messrs, Chairmen:

Honorable Devin Nuncs Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary

Honorable John Culberson
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science and Related Agencies

Honorable Jason Chaffetz Chairman Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

I write to supplement my October 28, 2016 letter that notified you the FBI would be taking additional investigative steps with respect to former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a personal email server. Since my letter, the FBI investigative team has been working around the clock to process and review a large volume of emails from a device obtained in connection with an unrelated criminal investigation. During that process, we reviewed all of the communications that were to or from Hillary Clinton while she was Secretary of State.

Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that we expressed in July with respect to Secretary Clinton.

I am very grateful to the prefessionals at the FBI for doing an extraordinary amount of high-quality work in a short period of time.

Sincerely yours

James B. Corney

ec: See next page

- 1 Honorable Dianne Feinstein Vice Chairman
 Select Committee on Intelligence
- 1 Horacat Je Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary
- Honorable Barbara Mikulski
 Ranking Member
 Committee on Appropriations
 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
 Science and Related Agencies
- 1 Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member
 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

- 1 Honorable Adam B. Schiff
 Ranking Member
 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
- 1 Honorable John Conyets, Ir-Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary
- 1 Honorack Michael Henda Ranking Member Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
- 1 Honorable Elijah E. Cummings Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

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UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENGLOSURE

Washington, D.C. 20535

November 29, 2016

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in further response to your letter dated October 18, 2016 posing questions arising from your review of materials provided to the Committee on October 14, 2016 related to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server. Specifically, this responds to your request for information concerning allegations of a *quid pro quo* in connection with a State Department request that the FBI downgrade the classification of a specific email in exchange for consideration of an FBI resource request.

By way of background and as reflected in documents previously provided to the Committee, on April 6, 2015, Records Management Division, received an email from the State Department requesting that the FBI conduct a classification review of several email communications involving former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which the State Department believed might have contained FBI information. There were multiple communications internal to the FBI and between the FBI and the State Department concerning the State Department's request that the FBI change the classification determination of a single sentence contained in one State Department email. In mid-May 2015, FBI was contacted by Under Secretary of State Patrick Kennedy concerning this matter. Under Secretary Kennedy hosted a meeting on May 19, 2015 regarding the classification issue. Ultimately, as reflected in the documents, the classification of the email was not changed, and it remains classified today.	b6 -1 b7C -
This request by the State Department and the FBI's response has been independently reviewed by both the FBI and the State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG). The FBI's investigative team interviewed on July 30, 2015, and on August 3, 2015 provided his internal FBI emails to the investigative team. (Copies of these 302s and the emails have been provided to the Committee.) Later that month, on August 28, 2015, the State Department OIG contacted requesting to speak with him about the meeting with Under Secretary Kennedy regarding the classification decision of an email containing FBI SECRET/NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE	b6 -1 b7C -

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information. advised the FBI's Inspection Division of State Department OIG interest in the matter. FBI Inspection Division then advised the investigative team as well as the Justice Department's Justice Management Division. On November 20, 2015, the FBI's Inspection Division provided State Department OIG with a copy of the State Department email at issue as well as emails to the State Department advising of the FBI's classification determination. (A copy of these documents is enclosed.) Ultimately, the State Department OIG met with on approximately December 15, 2015.	b6 -1 b7C -1
On approximately August 31, 2015, the FBI's investigative team met with the FBI's Inspection Division to discuss what, if any, internal actions were necessary to address the request of regarding additional overseas resources. The Inspection Division advised it did not warrant a separate review because who had been was scheduled for retirement at the end of the year, and no change was ultimately made to the classification was action, or interviewed FBI Inspection Division demurred on any investigative action, or interviewed as a reminder, the attached manner of the specific provides a significant dissipation of the year, and no change FBI investigative team interviewed as a reminder, the attached manner of the specific provides and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials are remarked as a significant of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.	b6 -1 b7C -1
Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs	
Enclosure	
1 - The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510	
retired on approximately SECRET/NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE	

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(INSD) (FBI)

From:

(INSD) (FBI)

Sent:

Friday, November 20, 2015 10:52 AM

To:

'seidedz@state.sgov.gov', 'costelloj@state.sgov.gov'; 'myersec@state.sgov.gov'

Subject:

DOS OIG Request for FBI Information -- SECRET//NOFORN

SentinelCaseld:

TRANSITORY RECORD

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Classified By: F26M89K80

Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301

Declassify on: 20401231

TRANSITORY RECORD











HRC emails, FOIA Stae Emails#2 ---

Coordination.


FOIA case HRC Benghazi/

case F-2015-... UNCLASSIFIED... Leview - Segment 2015-04841, p. FOIA Emails #1--..

Please see the attached emails provided per your request dated 18 32015, Item 4.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,



b6 -1 b7C -1

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Reid, Rosemary D [ReidRD@state.sgov.gov] Sent: Monday, April 06, 2015 11:36 AM To: b6 -1 Subject: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 b7C -1 Attachments: C05739808 - Clean.PDF; C05739808 - Work.PDF; FBI H-0003.pdf - attached is one document from segment H-3 for your review. There are two versions of the document and one marked with our review recommendation. Please let me know if you have any questions, Thanks so much, Rosemary Reid 202-663-1517 This email is UNCLASSIFIED. From: Gifford, Wesley P Sent: Monday, April 06, 2015 10:34 AM To: Reid, Rosemary D Cc: Tillery, Monica J Subject: Ref FBI H3 Wesley P Gifford US Department of State m Analyst 563-2074 GiffordWP@state.gov This email is UNCLASSIF

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Sulfivan, Ja. Sullivan J@state.gov> From: Sunday, No. 18, 2012 8:44 PM Senta To: H Subject Fw. FVI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection Fyì: From: Jones, Beth E Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 07:14 PM To: Burns, William J; Sherman, Wendy R; Sullivan, Jacob J Cc: Dibbte, Elizabeth L; Roebuck, William V. Subject: Fix: FYI - Report of arrests - possible Benghazi connection This preliminary, but very interesting, pls see below. F8f in Tripoli is fully involved b1 -1 From: Roebuck, William V bl per DOS Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 07:01 PM b3 -1 To: Jones, Beth E; Maxwell, Raymond D; Abdalla, Alyce N; Sidereas, Evyana; Miller, James N b7A per DOS Subject: PYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection b7D per DOS b7E per DOS Post reports that Libyans police have arrested several scopie today who may/may have some connection to the Benghazi attack. They were acting on information furnished by DS/RSO. $\{S\}$ That may or may not materialize, according to Zavid McFarland. Overall, this could lead to something againstionally, or not, and it could lead to news accounts from Libya saying there is a significant break in the see, or not. point, just F William V. Roebud Director Office of Maghreb Affairs FBI INFO. artment of State CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG REASON: 1.4 (C) 202-647-4679 DECLASSIFY CM: 12-31-2037 DATE: 04-04-2017 roebuckwiv@state.gov

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Case No. F-2015-04841

Segment: H-0003

Requester:

b6 -:

b6 per DOS

b7C -1

TO:

Record/Infe on Dissemination Section

Récords Management Division Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, DC 20535

FROM:

John F. Hackett, Acting Linecton

Office of Information Programs and Services

SUBJECT:

FOIA Referral for Conscitation

The attached Department of State material requested in the above FOIA case appears also to be of interest to your agency, and we are therefore referring it to you for constitution. In view of the strong public interest in this matter, we would appreciate your reply no later than close of business on Tuesday, April 7, 2017

The documents consist of emails sent to and/or from former Secretary of State Clintar on her private email account. For your information, these emails have already been provided to Congress in redacted form, the Department coordinated with the Department of Justice on that effort. We have duplicated those redactions, and have made some additional redactions under the FOIA which we believe warranted for wider distribution.

b6 -2. b7C -2

Please be advised that it is our intention to post all released material on the State Department's FOIA website.

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- 2 -

Our preliminary determinations and the each document. Portions for withholding (if any) are as indicated, and the exemptions are noted in the margin. Where we have requested concurrent review by other agencies, the names of those agencies are also shown on each document.

Before we take final action, we ask that you review this material. We ask that you not mark for deletion any portion of any document on none responsive grounds.

Please address your reply to Eric Stein at (stein @state.sgov.gov) and Rosemary Reid, at reidrd@state.sgov.gov). They an also be reached at steinef@state.gov or (202) 663-2190, and reidrd@state.gov or (202) 663-1517.

Should you receive any inquiries but this collection, please refer them directly to us for response. Administrative do not hesitate to contact us with any questions.

Attachments:

One document

Copy of request letter

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Sent.	Tuesday, March 03, 2015 1:50 Pr	Ŋ	
To:	FOIA Request		
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March 3, 2015			
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Former Secretary Hillary	Clinton's email address used to ema	iil State Departmen	t officials. Referenced here:
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-05-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG b6 -1 From: (RMD) (FBI) b7C -1 Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2015 5:05 PM To: 'Réid, Rosemary D' **5ubject:** RE: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 -- UNCLASSIFIED TRANSITORY RECORD SentinelCaseId: Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Still hanging..... From: Reid, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@state.sqov.gov] Sen<u>t: Wednesday, April</u> 08, 2015 11:57 AM To: (RMD) (F8I) Subject: RE: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 — UNCLASSIFIED Thanks! This email is UNCLASSIFIED. b7C -1 From: (RMD) (FBI) [mailto Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2015 11:55 AM To: Reid, Rosemary D Subject: RE: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 --- UNCLAS Classification: UNCLASSIFIED To follow up, I'm told "shortly." From: Reld, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov] Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2015 9:59 (RMD) (FBI) b7C -1 Subject: RE: Coordination Pevis Segment H-3 —- UNCLASSIFIFD Thank you very much This email is UNCO ÁSSIFIED. (RMD) (FBI) [mailto: b6 -1 Sept. Wednesday, April 08, 2015 8:35 AM b7C -1 · Reid, Rosemary D Subject: RE: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 --- UNCLASSIFIED Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Rosemary,

Segment H-3 chain --- UNCLASSIFIED.htm[10/15/2015 9:50:59 A

It is under review in the counterterrorism division front office. I'll have	more granularity—hopefully the approved response—
later this morning.	
	, to
<u> </u>	· · · · · · //
rom: Reid, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov]	b6 -1
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015 7:21 PM To: (RMD) (FBI)	b7c −1 ·
Subject: RE: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 UNCLASSIFIED	
I'm following up on the document that we sent to you for	review. Could you give me a status report tomorrow
morning?	
hanks,	
Rosemary Reid	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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From: Reid, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@faie.sgov.gov]	
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FBI (16cv2531)-16

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Got it, thanks!

From: Reid, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov] Sent: Monday. April 06, 2015 11:36 AM To:	b6 -1	
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and one marked with our review recommendation.		
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Please let me know if you have any questions,		, her
Thanks so much,		
Rosemary Reid		
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	J. C.	
From: Gifford, Wesley P		
Sent: Monday, April 06, 2015 10:34 AM To: Reid, Rosemary D		
Cc: Tillery, Monica J		
Subject: Ref FBI H3		•
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	·	•
Wesley P Glfford		
US Department of State		
Program Analyst		
(202) 663-2074		
GiffordWP@state.gov		•
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This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and		
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they	·	
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify		

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the system manager.

This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept by

MIMEsweeper for the presence of computer viruses.

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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SECRET/NOFORN From: (RMD) (FBI) b6 -1 CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG b7C -1 Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2015 11:18 AM DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040 To: Reid, Rosemary D' (RMD) (FBI) Co: ... Subject: Coordination Review - Segment H-3 -- SECRET/NOFORN Importance: SentinelCaseId: TRANSITORY RECORD Classification: SECRET/NOFORN Classified By: J23J98T32 Derived From: FBLNSIC, dated 20120629 Declassify On: 20401231 TRANSITORY RECORD Rosemary, b1 -1 Here is our response. I recommend you go ahead and classify the forwarding email to us in the future b3 -1 b7E -per DOS in case we determine there is classified information. This marking was proved by the CTD front the second bracies starts with, office. The first bracket starts with bracket The bl marking is SECRET//NORZEN. b7C -1 Classification: SECRE

-

RELEASE IN FULL

	Sullivan, Jacob J. <sullivanj@state.gov></sullivanj@state.gov>		
Sent	Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:44 PM		5
To:	H	•	Z.
Subject:	Fw. FYI - Report of arrests possible Benghazi con	nection '	
	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		
Fyl		Ż	200
Cc: Dibble, Elizabeth L;	erman, Wendy R. Sullivan, Jacob J		
This preliminary, but ver	ry interesting, pls see below. FBI in Tripoli is fully involved.		
From: Roebuck, William	IV	enigen () is dente the engagement minister for the materials and help the entertaint and opposite the first of the first o	bl -1 bl per
Sent: Sunday, Novembe			b1 pe1
To: Jones, Beth E: Maxv	vell, Raymond D; Abdalla, Alyce N; Sidereas, Evenia; Miller, J	lames N	b7A pe
	Farrests possible Benghazi connection		b7D pe
•		•	b7E pe
, , ,	X.A		
	ns police have arrested several people today who may/ They were acting on information furnished by DS/RSO.	may have some conn	_
		may have some conn	_
			_
the Benghazi attack. T	They were acting on information furnished by DS/R5O.		ection to
the Benghazi attack. T	They were acting on information furnished by DS/RSO.		hat may or
the Benghazi attack. T may not materialize, a this could lead to some	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at		hat may or
the Benghazi attack. T	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at		hat may or
may not materialize, a this could lead to some	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at		hat may or
the Benghazi attack. T may not materialize, a this could lead to some	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at		hat may or
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may not materialize, a this could lead to some is a significant break in At this point, just FYI. William V. Roebuck Director Office of Maghreb Affairs	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at		hat may or
may not materialize, a this could lead to some is a significant break in At this point, just FYI. William V. Roebuck Director Office of Maghreb Affairs	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at		hat may or
may not materialize, a this could lead to some is a significant break in At this point, just FYI.	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at	counts from Libya sa	hat may or Overall, ying there
may not materialize, a this could lead to some is a significant break in At this point, just FYI. William V. Roebuck Director Office of Maghreb Affairs	ccord Wid McFarland ething operationally, or not, and it could lead to news at	EBI INFO.	That may or Overall, ying there

SECRET//NOFORN

			ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
From:	Reid, Rosemary D [ReidRD@state.s	gov.gov]	HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG
Sent:	Wednesday, April 29, 2015 3:20 Pi	vi .	
To:	(RMD) (FBI)		
Subject:	HRC emails, FOIA case F-2015-048	41	
Attachments:	C05739708.pdf; C05739758.pdf; C0)5739635.pdf	
			, · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Confidential.		106 33.	in the second se
Unclassified when Separa	ated from Attachments	-48 64 7 5 5	
		·	
<u> </u>			
Thank you for your respon	nse of April 9 concerning your agency's	recommendation	s on one document, with you reviewed in
our case number F-2015-	-04841. I have been asked to send you	three more docur	nents from that same case. Please note that
the review on these thre-	e documents has not been finalized, so	the markings refle	ect the status are his time.
			J. J
First, is this the type of int	formation that your agency heeds to se	e? If so, do you h	ave recogninendations concerning the
releasability of the inform	nation pertaining to your agency? It wo	ould be very much	approxiated if you could get back to me as
soon as possible.			
		` X	Kind .
Thank you,	•	No.	
Rosemary Reid			•
202-663-1517			•
Confidential		£ 5^	
Unclassified when Separa	ted from Attachments	and a second	
			`
This document is LINCE	ASSIFIED when separated from CC	NEIDENTIAL :	attachment(s).
Sensitivity:	Sensitive X	A	
Classification:	CONFIDENTAL		
Classified By:	Rose Per Reid, Division Chief		
Derived From:	DS26 11-01		the second secon
Declassify On:	2625/04/29		
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STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI GOMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS, NO FOIA WAIVER.

RELEASE IN

Front: Sent: H hredinecontall.com Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:48 PM

To: Subject: millscol@state.gov Re: Visas Obtained

As planned....

ALL IBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE D4-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO

— Original menery of Imailto: Mills CD lost are gove From: Mills, the ryl of Imailto: Mills CD lost are gove Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:45 PM To: H

Subject: FW: Visas Obfained

— Original Message— From: Jones, Beth E

Sent; Sunday, September 16, 2012:12:46 PM

Tor Kennedy, Patrick P; Mills, Cheryl D; Sherman, Wendy R; Sullivan, Jacob J. Dishs, William J

Subject: FW: Visas Obtained

FBI got their visas for Libya today: Five members of team and three previous members. Legatt was counted separately and already has visa. The FBI team is Enjoure tonight, I am told.

STATE DEPT, - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SESECRET/NOFORN ACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE-SCB0045379

SECRET/NOFORN

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STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS, NO FOIA WAIVER.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED RELEASE IN PART CLEAR WITH NEA HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED B7(C),B7(A) DATE 04-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG From: Mills, Cheryl D < Mills CD@state.gov> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 8:06 AM . To: Subjects 87(C) b7A per DOS b7C per DOS Remind me to discuss. From: Randolnit, Lawrence M Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 7:47 AM To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Mills, Cheryl D; Macmanus, Joseph E (S) CC: S Special Assistants b7A per DOS b7C per DOS FYI-From: Slack, Anne Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 7:40 AM To: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry; Worman, Patrick F; 5_Special Assistants Cc: Siberell, Justin H., Rochman, Daniel A; Norman, Marc E; Witkowsky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellitto, Michael P; Sidereas, Evyenia Subject: RF b7A per DOS b7C per DOS Colleagues, Readout b7A per DOS b7C per DOS b5 per DOS

STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO NOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENS. TO LEAST A MICTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE-SC80045741

b7A per DOS b7C per DOS

b5 per DOS b7A per DOS b7C per DOS

	/
Best, Anne	
Anne Slack	
Funisia Desk	
Lee of Maghreb Affairs	
U.S. Department of State	·
Tel.: 202-647-4676	
From: Slack, Anne	No.
Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:55 AM	
Fo: Slack, Anne, Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry; Worman, Palish Se: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Norman, Marc E;	ALL STATES A Thomas And I Califer Parel at the
idereas, Evyenia	and the state of t
Subject: RE.	the state of the s
enderit vir	b7A per
Colleagues,	b7C per
	7
Regards, Anne	
From: Stack, Anne	
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM	İstanis
rom: Stack, Anne ient: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM o: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Winck F; S SpecialAss	istants sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellitto, Michael P;
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Marck F; S SpecialAss Ic: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Warman, Marc E; Witkow, Mereas, Evyenfa	istants sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellitto, Michael P;
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Marck F; S. SpecialAss Ic: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Warman, Marc E; Witkow, Merceas, Evyenfa	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellitto, Michael P;
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Worck F; S SpecialAss Cc: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Worman, Marc E; Witkow, Mercas, Evyenia Subject: RE;	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P;
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Worck F; S SpecialAss Cc: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Kerman, Marc E; Witkow, Mercas, Evyenia Subject: RE:	istants sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellitto, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Worck F; S SpecialAss Cc: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Kerman, Marc E; Witkow, Mercas, Evyenia Subject: RE:	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P;
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry; Worman, Marck F; S SpecialAss C: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Marrison, Marc E; Witkow, Mercas, Evyonia Subject: RE;	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P;
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From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Marc E; SpecialAss Co: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Arman, Marc E; Witkow idereas, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues,	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D Hey will provid
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Mick F; S SpecialAss Co: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Adminin, Marc E; Witkow idereas, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues, In Thursday before opening of business Washington hore. We	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D Hey will provid
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Mark F; S SpecialAss Co: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Acrosson, Marc E; Witkow, Merces, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues, It Thursday before opening of business Washington home. We less Asine	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Mark F; S SpecialAss Co: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Marrison, Mark E; Witkow, Mercas, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues, In Thursday, before opening of business Washington time. We wish Stack	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Janck F; S. SpecialAss Co: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Warman, Marc E; Witkow, Sidereas, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues, Thursday before opening of business Washington hine. We wine Slack unista Desk	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Mark F; S Special Ass C: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Astronom, Marc E; Witkow indereas, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues, Thursday before opening of business Washington time. We less Asine sine Stack unisia Desk Office of Maghreb Affairs	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D
From: Stack, Anne Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7,47 AM Fo: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry: Worman, Janck F; S. SpecialAss Co: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Warman, Marc E; Witkow Sidereas, Evyenfa Subject: RE; Colleagues, In Thursday before opening of business Washington time. We less Asine Line Slack	sky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellito, Michael P; 57A per D 57C per D

STATE BEPT. + PRODUCÉD

SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER,

CLEAR WITH NEA

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG RELEASE IN PAR 51.1.4(D)

From:

Syllivan, Jacob I <Sullivani i@state.gov>

Sent: To:

Wednesday, October 3, 2012 4:21 PM H

Subject:

FW. Tripoli trip

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on

Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassity on:

10/03/2022

iginal Message-Jones, Beth E

Sent: Salay, October 03, 2012 2:46 PM

To: Bering Milam I; Sherman, Wendy R; Sullivan, Jacob J; Kennedy, Patrick F; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Maxwell, Raymond D;

Roebuck, william V

Cc: Miller, James N; Blair, Oni K; Lakhdhir, Kandhir, Audille Talusur, Miller T; Lohman, Lei

Subject: Tripoli trip

Here are some withts from Tripoll. Every mental and the state of the s colleagues, and comment that Benghazi would provide the fact of the Secretary's meeting with President Magaret in NY last we have a large of US determination to continue To build the relations in the relations in the desired of the desired

mphasis on the importance of Libyan - FBI INVESTIGATION: With the PM, DFM and cooperation and transparency in the investigation. This is the point that Libya's performance will no doubt color American views on Obya at a time when Libya will want to burnish its reputation.

- SECURITY: 1-stressed that social stability and economic grown will depend on a dramatic improvement in security. All agreed without

hesitation. All said that Libya needs outside assistants but when we

discussed details of how to move forward on the historial programs we already have underway, each was quick to identify specific stumbling blocks on each. Especially with the Acting FM, we also identified next steps.

- TRAINING: We made progress on 1208; W. and MANPADS training programs - details to follow front channel. We will also follow up on judicial exchanges and forensic training.

- NEW GDVT FORMATION: Abusing or described the negotiation process as the single most difficult professional challenge he has ever faced. World us the government would be ready by October 3. Even though others warned us he would miss that deadling the to difficulty in reconciling the competing demands of various parties and individuals, he obviously made good on his Oct. 3 announcement undertaking.
- DDR: Abushagur will there are three main groups of militants to reintegrate: part lave jobs, part are heading back to university, and part will be offered vocational training. He said he will create a new Ministry of Human Development to oversee DDR; it's unclear how this new ministry will relate to numerous other GOL efforts on this. He expressed concern about the approximately 17,000 criminals released by Qadha some of whom Joined militias.

ANSITIONAL JUSTICE: The political leaders and judges all pledged to strike a balance between respecting the rights is detainees and holding human rights violators accountable. They acknowledged the profound limitations of their justice system.

STATE PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.

STATE-SCR0045561

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- UNSIVIL: I had a very good two hir meeting with General Smith to discuss how we can partner to help the new Libyan government improve security. He has good ideas on which we'll work closely.

I had separate meetings with #M-elect Abushagur, Acting/Deputy FM Abdel Aziz, Supreme Court Presidential bhan, Deputy Prosecutor General Hassadi, NEA Party leader libril, UNSMIL Security Advisor General Smith JCP (Muslim Brotherhood) Party political director Elbenanni, and sivil society leaders.

Morale at post is understandably rockly, but people are coping and continue to work hard in very difficult discumstances. There are some specific issues that the Department has already solved and others on which we can work to help the embassy in its determination to advance USG goals.

I leave for Cairo in a few minutes tonight. Beth

STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITE FOR TUNIOFOR TITIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER

STATE-SCB0045562

·· FBI (16cv2531)-26

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-04-2017 BY J37J85T94 WSICG

SECRET//NOFORN

From:	Reid, Rosemary D [ReidRD@state.sgov.gov]		
Sent:	Friday, May 08, 2015 11:48 AM		•
To:	(RMD) (FBI), Tillery, Monica J		b6 -1
Cc:	Gifford, Wesley P		b7C -1
Subject:	RE: HRC emails, FOIA case F-2015-04841 UNCL	_assified//fouo	//
Thank you very much!!			
Sensitive This email is UNCLASSIFIE	D.		X.
17110 011101110 011010 10011110			X
			•
F[]/pwo	V/P2\		-18th c
From: J(RMD Sent: Friday, May 08, 2015	0) (FBI) [mailto: 11:28 AM		
To: Reid, Rosemary D; Tiller			
Cc: Gifford, Wesley P	OIA case F-2015-04841 UNCLASSIFIED// FOUO	/* XX .	
	OIA Case F-2013-04641 UNCLASSIFIED/ F-600		
Classification: U	NCLASSIFIED/ /FOUO	b6 −1	
		b7C -1	
			•
The FBI is tine with the red:	actions which DOS recommends and has no real west	s for further redactions.	
E DILL B	X		
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 20	nalito:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov]		
To: (RMD) (FBI); Tillery, Monica J		
Cc: Gifford, Wesley P	OTA F DOLF O 4044 : UNIX ACCUTED / FOUND		
Subject: RE: HRC emails, H	OIA case F-2015-04841 UNA ASSIFIED//FOUO-		
l got your voice message sa	ying that we will probably get the docs tomorrow.	That is FANTASTIC! Thank yo	ou so much!
- Gensitive .		N	
This email is UNCLASSIFIE	D		
		•	
il .	, Kari	•	
From: (RMS)	(FBI) [mailto	h.c. 1	······································
From: (RMS Sent: Thursday, May 07,	15 3:06 PM	b6 -1 b7C -1	•
To: Reid, Rosemary D. Wer	y, Monica J		
	OIA case F-2015-04841 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO		
Classification: U	NCLASSIFIED/ FOUO		
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The state of the s			
Reid Rosemany D Im	ailto:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov]		
Thursday, May 07, 20	15 2:56 PM	ч	
(RMD) (FBI); Tillery, Monica J	b6 -1 .	
Grord, Wesley P	OIA case F-2015-04841 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-	b7C -1	
reassest inti the chair, i	ON COSC 1-2010 CHOTE CHICAGON TEDITION	•	•

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Thanks very much. Please keep me posted.		hallichall hallings
Sensitive This email is UNCLASSIFIED.		
- And the state of		de la
From: (RMD) (FBI) [mailto] Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2015 2:52 PM To: Reid, Rosemary D; Tillery, Monica J Cc: Gifford, Wesley P Subject: RE: HRC emails, FOIA case F-2015-04841 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO	b6 -1 b7c -1	
Classification: UNCDASSIFIED// FOUO-	- -	
Rosemary,		
I'm sorry, I've been trying to get an update from our CT Division. They are be	eing reviewed in CT.	
From: Reid, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2015 2:28 PM To:	b6 -1 b7c -1	
I have to give an update at a 4:00 meeting today sthere say thing I can tell	thera?	
Thanks, Rosemary		
Sensitive This email is UNCLASSIFIED		
From: (RMD) (FBI) [mailto: Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2015 5:02 PM To: Tillery, Mailto: J Cc: Reid, Resemany D; Gifford, Wesley P Subject RE: HRC emails, FOIA case F-2015-04841 — UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-	b6 -1 b7C -1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Cassification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUC	: .	
They are still with our counterterrorism division. I expect them tomorrow.		
		FUDATI FL

SECRET/NOFORN

RE HRC emails FOIA case F-2015-04841 --- UNCLASSIFIEDFOL-

FBI (16cv2531)-28

SECRET#NOFORN

From: J [mailto:TillerM]@state.sgov.gov] Sent: 5, 2015 9:36 AM To: (RMD) (FBI)	
Cc: Reid, Rosemary D; Gifford, Wesley P Subject: FW: HRC emails, FDIA case F-2015-04841 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Importance: High	b6 -1 b7c -1
Hello	
I'm following up on the three additional documents that we sent to you for revietoday?	ew. Could you give me a status report
Thanks, Monica Tillery	
-Sensitive-	
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.	
Rosemary,	
Just got a call from the CTD Front Office. The response has been approved. You she	uid have it tomorrow.
	·
From: Reid, Rosemary D Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 5:03 PM (RMD) (FBI) Lery, Monica J; Gifford, Wesley P Subject: RE: HRC emails, FOIA case F-2015-04841 — UNCLASS FIED//FOUO	ъ́6 -1 ъ7С -1
- I will be away from the office until next Tuesday. In all communications,	could you include Monica Till
Gifford (copied above).	
Thanks so much for all you help,	
Rosemary	•
	•
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.	
This citian is divolation let.	,
From: (\$MD) (FBI) [mailto: Sent: Wednesday, Apr. 29, 2015 5:32 PM	
To: Reid, Roseman To:	
Subject: RE: MSC emails, FOIA case F-2015-04841 UNITASSIFIED//FOUO	
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUC	b6 -1 " b7C -1
TRANSITORY RECORD	== 5/0 -1
	·
manks! Yes, this is the type of information we need to see. I'll need to consult with	CTD—it will go over tonight.
From: Reid, Rosemary D [mailto:ReidRD@state.sgov.gov]	
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2015 3:20 PM To: (RMD) (FBI)	
(KND) (LDI)	·

SECRET/NOFORN

Subject: HRC emails, FOIA o	ase F-2015-04841			
Confidential	15 024b-s			•
Unclassified when Separated	a from Attachments			` ` ` `
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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-05-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

November 29, 2016

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20315

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in further response to your letter dated October 20, 2016 posing questions arising from your review of materials provided to the Committee on October 14, 2016 related to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server. Specifically, this responds to your request for information concerning allegations of a quilibre connection with a State Department request that the FBI downgrade the class as specific email in exchange for consideration of an FBI resource request.

	By way of background and as reflected in documents previously provided to the	
	Committee, on April 6, 2015, Records Management Division,	
	received an email from the State Department requesting that the FBI conduct a classification	
	review of several email communications involving former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,	
	which the State Department believed might have contained FBI information. There were	b6 -1
	multiple communications internal to the FBI and between the FBI and the State Department	b7C -1
	concerning the State Department's request that the FBI change the classification determination of	
	a single sentence contained in one State Department email. In mid-May 2015, FB1	
Ì	was contacted by Under Secretary of State Patrick	
•	Kennedy concerning this matter. Under Secretary Kennedy hosted a meeting on May 19, 2015	
	de classification issue. Ultimately the decuments, the classification of	
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	request by the State Department and the serious has been independently	
	reviewed by both the FBI and the State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG). The	
	FBI's investigative team interviewed on July 30, 2015, and on August 3, 2015	1.6 4
	provided his internal FBI emails to the investigative team. (Copies of these 302s and the	b6 -1 b7C -1
	emails have been provided to the Committee.) Later that month, on August 28, 2015, the State	D,C 1
	Department OIG contacted requesting to speak with him about the meeting with	
	Under Secretary Kennedy regarding the classification decision of an email containing FRI	

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information. advised the FBI's Inspection Division of State Department OIG interest in the matter. FBI Inspection Division then advised the investigative team as well as the Justice Department's Justice Management Division. On November 20, 2015, the FBI's Inspection Division provided State Department OIG with a copy of the State Department email at issue as well as emails to the State Department advising of the FBI's classification determination. (A copy of these documents is enclosed.) Ultimately, the State Department OIG met with on approximately December 15, 2015.	Ь6 −1 Ь7С −1
On approximately August 31, 2015, the FBI's investigative team met with the FBI's Inspection Division to discuss what, if any, internal actions were necessary to address the request of regarding additional overseas resources. The Inspection Division advised it did not warrant a separate review because who had been was scheduled for retirement at the end of the year, and no change was ultimately made to the classification determination. When the FBI Inspection Division demurred on any investigative action, on September 3, 2015, the FBI investigative team interviewed	ъ6 −1 ъ7с −1
As a reminder, the attached material is provided to the Committee in furtherance of its oversight activities. These materials are non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.	
Sincerely,	
Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs	
Enclosure	
 1 - The Honorable Elijah Cummings Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U. S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 	
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

June 21, 2016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HERRIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-05-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

The Honorable Barbara Comstock Member of Congress Suite 218 21430 Cedar Drive Sterling, VA 20164

Dear Congresswoman Comstock:

This is in response to your April 21, 2016, inquiry on behalf of your constituent regarding former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.	b6 -3
While we appreciate your bringing concerns to our attention, due to a long-standing FBI and Department of Justice policy, we are prohibited from commenting on an ongoing investigation. Preventing the premature release of information ensures the integrity of our criminal justice system and any potential judicial proceeding resulting from FBI investigations.	

I hope this information is helpful to you in responding to your constituent.

Sincerely,


Elizabeth R. Bee

Section Chief

Office of Congressional Affairs

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Elizabeth R. Beers on Chief

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASS DATE 04-05-2017 E 1857 1857 NSIC

AUG 1 6 2016

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to your letters to Director Comey dated May 17, 2016 and July 6, 2016 regarding the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server. As Director Comey said in his statement on July 5, 2016, due to intense public interest in the FBI's investigation into this matter, we believe it is important to address your questions and explain our recommendation as to the appropriate resolution of this investigation. For the same reasons, the FBI will be making a document production responding to your interest in this matter.

The FBI conducted this investigation, as it does all investigations, in a competent, honest, and independent way. We had an investigative team of agents and analysts supported by technical experts, lawyers, and others from several divisions in the FBI. The investigative team worked for close to a year conducting interviews, reviewing emails, and completing technical examinations of recovered equipment. In addition, the FBI's technical team conducted extensive analysis to understand what, if any, indications there might be of a compromise of Secretary Clinton's electronic devices by hostile actors.

After nearly a year of gathering and analyzing evidence from numerous sources, the FBI made a recommendation to the Department of Justice. Although the prosecutors make the ultimate decision about whether or not charges are appropriate based on the evidence, the FBI frequently makes recommendations and engages in conversations with the prosecutors regarding the appropriate resolution of an investigation, given the evidence. The fact that the FBI made a recommendation was not unusual; the fact that it was shared publicly was.

Our investigation looked at whether there was evidence that classified information was improperly stored or transmitted on Secretary Clinton's private email system, in violation of a federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 793) that makes it a felony to mishandle classified information either intentionally or in a grossly negligent way, or another statute (18 U.S.C. § 1924) that makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly remove classified information from appropriate systems or storage facilities. We also considered a statute (18 U.S.C. § 2071) making it illegal to willfully and unlawfully conceal, remove, or destroy a federal record. Ultimately, the FBI did not recommend

prosecution based on an assessment of the facts and a review of how these statutes have been charged in the past.

As the Director testified, cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice under the relevant statutes involved some combination of: (1) clearly intentional and willful mishandling of classified information; (2) significant quantities of material exposed in such a way as to support an inference of intentional misconduct; (3) indications of disloyalty to the United States; or (4) efforts to obstruct justice. One or more of these factors was present in the cases against David Petraeus, Sandy Berger, and Bryan Nishimura. For instance, Petraeus provided vast quantities of highly sensitive, compartmented information that he knew to be classified to a person without an appropriate clearance or a need to know the information and, when confronted, he lied to the FBI. Berger removed clearly marked, highly classification from the National Archives. by secreting the documents in his clothic less cases included clear evidence of knowledge and intent which illustrates an important ection from what the FBI found in this investigation. Nishimura, a Naval Reservise stationed in Afghanistan, removed hundreds of marked classified documents, without authorization, from classified U.S. military information systems, which he then placed onto several personally-owned, unauthorized devices. Nishimura later lied to investigators about onto which devices he had placed classified information, and destroyed a large quantity of classified material he had maintained in his home. Despite this, destruction, a subsequent search of his house recovered 256 marked classified documents which he was not authorized to store.

The fact that Secretary Clinton received emails containing "(C)" portion markings is not clear evidence of knowledge or intent. As the Direct that testified, the FBI's investigation uncovered three instances of emails portioned market "(C)," a marking ostensibly indicating the presence of information classified at the confidential level. In each of these instances, the contrary did not originate the information; instead, the emails were forwarded to her by staff meanisms, with the portion-marked information located within the email chains and without header and footer markings indicating the presence of classified information. Moreover, only one of those emails was determined by the State Department to contain classified information. There has been no determination by the State Department as to whether these three emails were classified at the time they were sent.

Nor is the fact that Secretary Clinton emailed former Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan asking him to remove "identifying heading[s]" from a document and "send nonsecure" as a "nonpaper" sufficient evidence to show that she knowingly or willfully mishandled classified information. As we understand the common State Department use of the term, "nonpaper" refers to a document authorized for distribution to a foreign government that is without explicit attribution to the U.S. Government and would not contain classified information. In their interiors with the FBI, both Secretary Clinton and Sullivan indicated their understanding that this within instruction to remove classified information from the talking points, in order to send the resulting unclassified document through non-secure means. Moreover, the FBI investigation determined that a secure fax was successfully sent subsequent to this message, and no evidence was recovered indicating that the unclassified "non-paper" was ever created or sent over the unclassified email system.

During the course of its investigation, the FBI conducted numerous interviews, including one of John Bentel, then-Director of SES-IRM, the State Department official referenced in the State Department OIG report as having discouraged employees from raising concerns about Secretary Clinton's use of personal email. In his FBI interview, Bentel denied that State Department employees raised concerns about Secretary Clinton's email to him. The FBI ultimately considered the inconsistencies between Bentel's statements to the FBI and his subordinates' reported statements to investigators with the Department of State Inspector General to be outside the scope of its investigation, and, further, ones which had been appropriately addressed by the Department of State Inspector General.

During the course of the investigation, the FBI interviewed Department of State security employees and reviewed documents regarding cyber security, including the Boswell memorandum, which outlined an increase in cyber actors targeting the personal email accounts of State Department employees. As Secretary Clinton did not believe she would or did receive classified emails on her personal email system, it is unclear that a warning of this nature would have had any impact on her conduct or intent.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 793 on its face makes it a felony to cause national defense information to be removed, lost, stolen, or destroyed through gross negligence. Even at the time the statute was passed, there were concerns in Congress about the inclusion of this provision. Additionally, with respect to this statute, there are concerns about the constitutional implications of criminalizing such conduct without requiring the government to prove that the person knew he or she was doing something wrong, which is reflected in the Justice Department's history in charging this specific subsection of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 793(f)). Our understanding is the Department has only charged one person with mishandling national defense information through gross negligence in the 99-year history of the statute, and in that case, the charge was dismissed when the defendant pled guilty to making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Moreover, in that case, there were indications of espionage and disloyalty to the United States. As the Director testified, he believed that to prosecute Secretary Clinton or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence would be inconsistent with how the Department has interpreted and applied the statute since Congress enacted it.

Olleague were extremely careless in their handling of certain, very sensitive, highly classified information. The term "extremely careless" was intended to be a common sense way of describing the actions of Secretary Clinton and her colleagues. The Director did not equate "extreme carelessness" with the legal standard of "gross negligence" that is required by the statute. In this case, the FBI assessed that the facts did not support a recommendation to prosecute her or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence.

¹ The FBI interviewed former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 2, 2016. Although there had been contact with Secretary Clinton's attorneys during the course of the investigation, we did not request an interview until June 2016 after sufficient facts were gathered to properly inform the interview, which is common in investigations of this nature.

However, as the Director has explained, this is not to say that someone else who engaged in this type of conduct would face no consequences for handling classified information in a similar manner if they were still a government employee. For example, there are potentially severe administrative consequences within the FBI for security violations involving the mishandling of classified information, up to and including security clearance revocation and dismissal. The FBI is in the process of providing relevant information to other U.S. Government agencies to conduct further security and administrative reviews they deem appropriate for their respective employees. If someone who engaged in this type of conduct applied for a job at the FBI, the facts and circumstances surrounding this activity would be a significant factor in a suitability review for a security clearance and employment at the Bureau.

As the Director noted in his statement, the FBI made its recommendation concerning this matter to the Justice Department independent of any constitution with the Attorney General or any White House officials, and the investigation was conducted without any improper political influence of any kind. For this reason, the FBI does not believe the appointment of a Special Counsel is warranted. In addition, the FBI would refer you to the Department of Justice for any explanation of legal agreements that may or may not have been made with potential witnesses, as well as other judgments or decisions made by Department of Justice officials.

Lastly, concerning questions related to whether other matters may be under investigation, consistent with prior statements, the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of non-public investigations.

Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBI. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

 The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-05-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to your letters to Director Comey dated May 17, 2016 and July 6, 2016 regarding the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server. As Director Comey said in his statement on July 5, 2016, due to intense public interest in the FBI's investigation into this matter, we believe it is important to address your questions and explain our recommendation as to the appropriate resolution of this investigation. For the same reasons, the FBI will be making a document production responding to your interest in this matter.

The FBI conducted this investigation, as it does all investigations, in a competent, honest, and independent way. We had an investigative team of agents and analysts supported by technical experts, lawyers, and others from several divisions in the FBI. The investigative team worked for close to a year conducting interviews, reviewing emails, and completing technical examinations of recovered equipment. In addition, the FBI's technical team conducted extensive analysis to understand what, if any, indications there might be of a compromise of Secretary Clinton's electronic devices by hostile actors.

After nearly a year of gathering and analyzing evidence from numerous sources, the FBI made a recommendation to the Department of Justice. Although the prosecutors make the ultimate decision about whether or not charges are appropriate based on the evidence, the FBI frequently makes recommendations and engages in conversations with the prosecutors regarding the appropriate resolution of an investigation, given the evidence. The fact that the FBI made a recommendation was not unusual; the fact that it was shared publicly was.

Dep. Director 1 - The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy FAD-Adm FAD-CT/CI Ranking Member FAD-Crim EAD-Intel1 Committee on the Judiciary EAD-LES Asst. Dir.: United States Senate Adm. Serv. Washington, DC 20510 CHS Ctrintell. 1 - FBI ExecSec, Room 6147 TRIM #s 16/DO/1759, 16/DO/2349 Cirterronsm Crim. In v. _ 1 - A/AD Herring JVH Cyber Finance 1 - Ms. Beers Info. Res. Inspection ln v. Tech. Laboratory Off. of Cong. Affs. Off. of the Gen. Coun. Off of Intell. Off. Pub. Affs Off. of Prof. Resp. Rec. Mgint. Security Training. MAIL ROOM [] Off. of EEOA _

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Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-06-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

AUG 1 6 2016

The Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to your letter to Director Comey dated July 6, 2016 regarding the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server. As Director Comey said in his statement on July 5, 2016, due to intense public interest in the FBI's investigation into this matter, we believe it is important to address your questions and explain our recommendation as to the appropriate resolution of this investigation. For the same reasons, the FBI will be making a document product sponding to your interest in this matter.

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Clinton or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence would be inconsistent with how the Department has interpreted and applied the statute since Congress enacted it.

As the Director stated, the FBI did find evidence that Secretary Clinton and her colleagues were extremely careless in their handling of certain, very sensitive, highly classified information. The term "extremely careless" was intended to be a common sense way of describing the actions of Secretary Clinton and her colleagues. The Director did not equate "extreme carelessness" with the legal standard of "gross negligence" that is required by the statute. In this case, the FBI assessed that the facts did not support a recommendation to prosecute her or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence.

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Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBI. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - The Honorable Adam B. Schiff
 Ranking Member
 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE D4-06-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

The Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to your letter to Director Comey dated July 6, 2016 regarding the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server. As Director Comey said in his statement on July 5, 2016, due to intense public interest in the FBI's investigation into this matter, we believe it is important to address your questions and explain our recommendation as to the appropriate resolution of this investigation. For the same reasons, the FBI will be making a document production responding to your interest in this matter.

The FBI conducted this investigation, as it does all investigations, in a competent, honest, and independent way. We had an investigative team of agents and analysts supported by technical experts, lawyers, and others from several divisions in the FBI. The investigative team worked for close to a year conducting interviews, reviewing emails, and completing technical examinations of recovered equipment. In addition, the FBI's technical team conducted extensive analysis to understand what, if any, indications there might be of a conducted extensive Clinton's electronic devices by hostile actors.

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Dep. Director EAD-Adm EAD-CT/CI EAD-Intell. EAD-LES Asst. Dir : Adm. Serv. CJIS Ctrintell. Ctremonism	 I - The Honorable Adam B. Schiff Ranking Member Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 1 - FBI ExecSec, Room 6I47 TRIM #s TRIM # 16/DO/2374
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As the Director testified, cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice under the relevant statutes involved some combination of: (1) clearly intentional and willful mishandling of classified information; (2) significant quantities of material exposed in such a way as to support an inference of intentional misconduct; (3) indications of disloyalty to the United States; or (4) efforts to obstruct justice. One or more of these factors was present in the cases against David Petraeus, Sandy Berger, and Bryan Nishimura. For instance, Petraeus provided vast quantities of highly sensitive, compartmented information that he knew to be classified to a person without an appropriate clearance or a need to know the information and, when confronted, he lied to the FBI. Berger removed clearly marked, highly classified information from the National Archives by secreting the documents in his clothing. These cases included clear evidence of knowledge and intent which illustrates an important distinction from what the FBI found in this investigation. Nishimura, a Naval Reservist stationed in Afghanistan, removed hundreds of marked classified documents, without authorization, from classified U.S. military information systems, which he then placed onto several personally-owned, unauthorized devices. Nishimura later fied to investigators about onto which devices he had placed classified information, and destroyed a large quantity of classified material he had maintained in his home. Despite this destruction, a subsequent search of his house recovered 256 marked classified documents which he was not authorized to store.

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Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - The Honorable Adam B. Schiff
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIM IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-06-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO

AUG 1 6 2016

The Honorable-Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Ranking Member
Committee on light and
Governmen orm
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member:

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Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS 1 AUSIFIED DATE 04-06 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

AUG 1 6 2016

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Rec. Mgmt. Security ___ Training ___

Off: of EEOA

Dear Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member:

MAIL ROOM (3)

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EAD-LES	examinations of recovered equipment. In addition, the FBI's technical team conducted extensive
Adm. Serv.	analysis to understand what, if any, indications there might be of a compromise of Secretary
	Clinton's electronic devices by hostile actors.
Cirterrorism Crim. Inv	
Cyber	1 - FRI EvecSec_Room 6147 TRIM #s 16/DO/2656_16/DO/2437
Info. Res.	1 - A/AD Herring 1 - Ms. Beers
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Off. Pub. Affs	

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The Honorable Jason Chaffetz and The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

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Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIM IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-06-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

The Honorable Robert Goodlatte
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States House of Representatives
Washington_DC 20515

AUG 1 6 7016

Dear Mr. Charman:

are writing in response to your letter to Director Comey dated July 5, 2016 regarding in 1315 in estigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email of the Pilotor Comey said in his statement on July 5, 2016, due to intense public interest in the Pilotor commendation as to the appropriate resolution of this investigation. For the same reasons, the PBI will be making a document production responding to your interest in this matter.

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Lastly, concerning questions related to whether other matters may be under investigation, consistent with prior statements, the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of non-public investigations.

Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBI. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

The Honorable John Conyers
 Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIM IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-06-2017 BY 337385T94 NSICG

AUG 1 6 2016

The Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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As the Director testified, cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice under the relevant statutes involved some combination of: (1) clearly intentional and willful mishandling of fied information; (2) significant quantities of material exposed in such a way as to support Reference of intentional misconduct; (3) indications of disloyalty to the United States; or (4) efforts to obstruct justice. One or more of these factors was present in the cases against David Petracus, Sandy Berger, and Bryan Nishimura. For instance, Petraeus provided vast quantities of highly sensitive, compartmented information that he knew to be classified to a person without an appropriate clearance or a need to know the information and, when confronted, he lied to the FBI. Berger removed clearly marked, highly classified information from the National Archives by secreting the documents in his clothing. These cases included clear evidence of knowledge and intent which illustrates an important distinction from what the FBI found in this investigation. Nishimura, a Naval Reservist stationed in Afghanistan, removed hundreds of marked classified documents, without authorization, from classified U.S. military information systems, which he then placed onto several personally-owned, unauthorized devices. Nishimura later lied to investigators about onto which devices he had placed classified information, and destroyed a large quantity of classified material he had maintained in his home. Despite this destruction. seguent search of his house recovered 256 marked classified documents which he was not an extended to store.

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Title 18, United States Code, Section 793 on its face makes it a felony to cause national defense information to be removed, lost, stolen, or destroyed through gross negligence. Even at the time the statute was passed, there were concerns in Congress about the inclusion of this provision. Additionally, with respect to this statute, there are concems about the constitutional implications of criminalizing such conduct without requiring the government to prove that the person knew he or she was doing something wrong, which is reflected in the Justice

Department's history in charging this specific subsection of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 793(f)). Our understanding is the Department has only charged one person with mishandling national defense information through gross negligence in the 99-year history of the statute, and in that case, the charge was diamissed when the defendant pled guilty to making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Moreover, in that case, there were indications of espionage and disloyalty to the United States. As the Director testified, he believed that to prosecute Secretary Clinton or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence would be inconsistent with how the Department has interpreted and applied the statute since Congress enacted it.

As the Director stated, the FBI did first dence that Secretary Clinton and her colleagues were extremely careless in their handling of certain, very sensitive, highly classified information. The term "extremely careless" was intended to be a common sense way of describing the actions of Secretary Clinton and her colleagues. The Director did not equate "extreme carelessness" with the legal standard of "gross negligence" that is required by the statute. In this case, the FBI assessed that the facts did not support a recommendation to prosecute her or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence.

However, as the Director has explained, this is not to say that someone else who engaged in this type of conduct would face no consequences for handling classified information in a similar manner if they were still a government employee. For example, there are potentially severe administrative consequences within the FBI for security violations involving the mishandling of classified information, up to and including security clearance revocation and dismissal. The FBI is in the process of providing relevant information to other U.S. Government agencies to conduct further security and administrative reviews they deem appropriate for their respective employees. If someone who engaged in this type of conduct applied for a job at the FBI, the facts and circumstances surrounding this activity would be a significant factor in a suitability review for a security clearance and employment at the Bureau.

Lastly, concerning questions related to whether other matters may be under investigation, consistent with prior statements, the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of non-public investigations.

Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBl. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

AUG 1 6 2016

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Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBI. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

 The Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIM IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-06-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO

The Honorable Roal officiand
Chairman
Committee of Honorand Security and
Governmental Alfans
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Off. of EEOA

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Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBI. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 1, 2016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-06-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO

Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter dated August 22, 2016, requesting access to documents related to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a private email server during her tenure, and based on a parallel request from the Department of State, the FBI authorizes Senate Foreign Relations Committee access to these documents currently maintained in the Office of Senate Security for review by Committee members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's Department of State oversight responsibilities. These documents are non-public and control and it disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of the production of the concurrence and applicable privilege.

Throughout the documents the FBI has redacted personally identifiable information as appropriate. Additionally, at the request of the original classification authority, certain materials were provided only to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Sineerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

 Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

I - Office of Senate Security United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510

September 1, 2016

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

The Honorable Paul D. Ryan Speaker United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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m. V.

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Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

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AUG 1 6 2016

The Honorable Paul D. Ryan Speaker United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

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Off. of EEOA

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As the Director testified, cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice under the relevant statutes involved some combination of: (1) clearly intentional and willful mishandling of classified information; (2) significant quantities of material exposed in such a way as to support an inference of intentional misconduct; (3) indications of disloyalty to the United States; or (4) efforts to obstruct justice. One or more of these factors was present in the cases against David Petraeus, Sandy Berger, and Bryan Nishimura. For instance, Petraeus provided vast quantities of highly sensitive, compartmented information that he knew to be classified to a person without an appropriate clearance or a need to know the information and, when confronted, he lied to the FBI. Berger removed clearly marked, highly classified information from the National Archives by secreting the documents in his clothing. These cases included clear evidence of knowledge and intent which illustrates an important distinction from what the found in this investigation. Nishimura, a Naval Reservist stationed in Afghanistan removed hundreds of marked classified documents, without authorization, from classified U.S. military informations systems, which he then placed onto several personally-owned, unauthorized devices. Nishumica later lied to investigators about onto which devices he had placed classified information, and destroyed a large quantity of classified material he had maintained in his home. Despite destruction, a subsequent search of his house recovered 256 marked classified documents he was not authorized to store.

The fact that Secretary Clinton received emails containing "(C)" portion markings is not clear evidence of knowledge or intent. As the Director has testified, the FBI's investigation uncovered three instances of emails portioned marked with "(C)," a marking ostensibly indicating the presence of information classified at the Confidential level. In each of these instances, the Secretary did not originate the information instead, the emails were forwarded to her by staff members, with the portion-marked information is cated within the email chains and without header and footer markings indicating the presence of classified information. Moreover, only one of those emails was determined by the State Department to contain classified information. There has been no determination by the State Department as to whether these three emails were classified at the time they were sent.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 793 on its face makes it a felony to cause national defense information to be removed, lost, stolen, or destroyed through gross negligence. Even at the time the statute was passed, there were concerns in Congress about the inclusion of this provision. Additionally, with respect to this statute, there are concerns about the constitutional implications of criminalizing such conduct without requiring the government to prove that the person knew he or she was doing something wrong, which is reflected in the Justice Department's history in charging this specific subsection of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 793(f)). Our understanding is the Department has only charged one person with mishandling national defense information through gross negligence in the 99-year history of the statute, and in that case, the charge was dismissed when the defendant pled guilty to making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Moreover, in that case, there were indications of espionage and disloyalty to the United States. As the Director testified, he believed that to prosecute Secretary Clinton or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence would be inconsistent with how the Department has interpreted and applied the statute since Congress enacted it.

As the Director stated, the FBI did find evidence that Secretary Clinton and her colleagues were extremely careless in their handling of certain, very state, highly classified information. The term "extremely careless" was intended to be a complete ense way of describing the actions of Secretary Clinton and her colleagues. The Director did not equate "extreme carelessness" with the legal standard of "gross negligence" that is required by the statute. In this case, the FBI assessed that the facts did not support a recommendation to prosecute her or others within the scope of the investigation for gross negligence.

However, as the Director has explained, this is not to say that someone else who engaged in this type of conduct would face no consequences for handling classified information in a similar manner if they were still a government employee. For example, there are potentially severe administrative consequences within the FBI for security violations involving the mishandling of classified information, up to and including security clearance revocation and dismissal. The FBI is in the process of providing relevant information to other U.S. Government agencies to conduct further security and administrative reviews they deem appropriate for their respective employees. If someone who engaged in this type of conduct applied for a job at the FBI, the facts and circumstances surrounding this activity would be a significant factor in a suitability review for a security clearance and employment at the Bureau.

Thank you for your continued interest in this important matter, and, as always, we appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the FBI. The production of documents related to this matter will be provided under separate cover letter consistent with required protocols for the transmission of classified documents.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

November 18, 2016

Honorable Jason Chaffetz Chairman Committee on Oversight and Government Reform United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter dated October 20, 2016 posing questions arising from your review of materials provided to the Committee on October 14, 2016 related to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server. Specifically, you requested information concerning allegations that the State Department asked the FBI to downgrade the classification of a specific email in exchange for consideration of an FBI resource request.

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Sincerely.

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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1- Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 MSICG

November 18, 2016

Honorable Jason Chaffetz Chairman Committee on Oversight and Government Reform United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

November 18, 2016

Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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1- Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

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November 18, 2016

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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DATE: 34-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Washington, D.C. 20535

July 1, 2016

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Grassley:

This is in response to your letter dated February 4, 2016 regarding the use of non-disclosure agreements in the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a private e-mail server.

The FBI asked the limited number of personnel working on this matter to sign "Case Briefing Acknowledgment" forms and, after receipt of your letter, an addendum to that form, which reminded them of their whistleblower rights and clarified that the form did not override or supersede those rights. These forms served two purposes: to maintain an official record of all persons knowledgeable of this highly sensitive investigation, and to remind individuals of their obligations to protect classified and sensitive information. No one refused to sign the acknowledgement or raised any questions or concerns about doing so.

This was not a unique circumstance; depending on the sensitivities in a given investigation, FBI employees may from time to time be asked to sign similar forms. In addition, all FBI employees sign standard form non-disclosure agreements (NDA) upon obtaining their security briefings, and they remain bound by those agreements throughout the course of their employment. The standard form NDA includes the requisite language to address all legal requirements, including whistleblower protections. The FBI is taking steps to ensure that future regions to employees of non-disclosure obligations similarly contain language acknowledging whistleblower protections. Copies of both the Case Briefing Acknowledgement form and the addendum are enclosed.

We appreciate your continued support for the FBI and its mission. If you have questions concerning this or other matters, please contact this office by calling (202) 324-5051.

Sincerely,

Stephen D. Kelly

Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

July 1, 2016

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The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

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
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Sincerely,

Stephen D. Kelly Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judicia United States Senate Washington, DC 20510



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535.

Honorable Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, the FBI is providing for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. These materials are being provided for review by Committee Members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's oversight responsibilities. These materials are non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

Throughout the documents the FBI has redacted personally identifiable information as appropriate. Additionally, at the request of the original classification authority, certain materials are being provided only to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
 Ranking Member
 Committee on Oversight and
 Government Reform
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

AUG 1 6 2016

Honorable Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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Thank you for your continued support of the

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, the FBI is providing for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. These materials are being provided for review by Committee Members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's oversight responsibilities. These materials are non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

Throughout the documents the FBI has redacted personally Reminable information as appropriate. Additionally, at the request of the original classification authority, certain materials are being provided only to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Thank you for your continued support of the FB1.

Sincerely,

Fason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

 The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

1 - Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510 Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

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
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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring .
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

Dep. Director_ EAD-Adm. I - The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy EAD-CT/CI Ranking Member EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell. Committee on the Judiciary EAD-LES Asst. Dir.: United States Senate Adm. Serv. CIIS Washington, DC 20510 Ctrintell. Ctrlemonism Crim. Inv. - Office of Senate Security Cyber Finance Office of the Secretary United States Senate Inspection Inv. Tech. SVC-217 f Cong. Affs.
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable John Culberson Chairman Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2016

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

- Honorable Michael Honda
 Ranking Member
 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
 and Related Agencies
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Honorable John Culberson
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2016

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

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U.S. Department of fusice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, the FBI is providing for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. These materials are being provided for review by Committee Members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's oversight responsibilities. These materials are non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

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Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

I - Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
 Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20535

I - Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY A37J85T94 NSICG

Honorable Robert Goodlatte
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

AUG 1 6 2018

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, the FBI is providing for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. These materials are being provided for review by Committee Members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's oversight responsibilities. These materials are non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.


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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

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Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

Dep. Director EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell. EAD-LES Asst. Dir.: Adm. Serv. CJIS Ctrintell.	Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Repre	sentatives
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

- 1 The Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member
 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- Office of Senate Security
 Office of the Secretary
 United States Senate
 SVC-217
 Washington, DC 20510

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY JS7J85T94 NSICG

Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

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
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Jason V. Herring
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Office of Congressional Affairs

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1 - Ms. Beers



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, the FBI is providing for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. These materials are being provided for review by Committee Members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's oversight responsibilities. These materials are non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

Honorable Dianne Feinstein
 Vice Chairman
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510

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Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

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Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

Dep. Director EAD-Adm EAD-CT/CI EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell. EAD-LES Asst. Dir.: Adın. Serv. 1 - Honorable Dianne Feinstein CIIS Cinntell. Vice Chairman Cliferrorism Crim. Inv. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Cyber United States Senate Finance Info. Res. Washington, DC 20510 Inspection Inv. Tech. Laboratory Off, of Cong. Affs, 1 - FBI ExecSec, Room Off. of the Gen. 1 - A/AD Herring 1 - Ms. Beers Coun. Off of Intell. Off. Pub. Affs. Off. of Prof. Resp. Rec. Memt. Security

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable Devin Nunes
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

AUG 1 6 2016

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Jason V. Herring

Sincerely,

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

The Honorable Adam B. Schiff
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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AUG 1 6 2016

Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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
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Office of Congressional Affairs

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 5 2016 -

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Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

- Honovable Barbara Mikulski

Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
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United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

1 - Office of Senate Security
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SVC-217

Washington, DC 20510

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Hospital Richard Shelby Carran Contractitee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

AUG 1 6 2016

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

Dep. Director EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI EAD-Crim EAD-Intell. 1 - Honorable Barbara Mikulski EAD-LES Asst. Dir.: Committee on Appropriations Adm. Serv. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science CHS Ctrintell and Related Agencies Ctrtegorism Crim, Inv. United States Senate Cyber Finance Washington, DC 20510 Info. Res. Inspection lnv. Tech. 1 - Office of Senate Security atory of Cong. Affs. Office of the Secretary fthe Gen. Coun United States Senate Olf of Intell. SVC-217 Off. Pub. Affs Off. of Prof. Resp. Washington, DC 20510 Rec. Mgmi. Security Training 1 - FBI ExecSec Room Off. of REOA 1 - A/AD Herrin

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535 September 1, 2016

Honorable Bob Corker Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter dated August 22, 2016, requesting access to documents related to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary of State Clinton's use of a private email server during her tenure, and based on a parallel request from the Department of State, the FBI authorizes Senate Foreign Relations Committee access to these documents currently maintained in the Office of Senate Security for review by Committee members and appropriately-cleared staff in light of the Committee's Department of State oversight responsibilities. These documents are non-public and control and it days and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disconnected and control and it disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The product of the sensitive materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

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Sineerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

- Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, DC 20510
- I Office of Senate Security United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510

September 1, 2016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:


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
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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

Dep. Director EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI - Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin EAD-Cnm. EAD-Intell Ranking Member EAD-LES Committee on Foreign Relations Asst. Dir.: Adm. Serv. United States Senate Cirintell. Washington, DC 20510 Ctrterrorism Crim. Inv._ 1 - Office of Senate Security Cyber_ United States Senate Finance Info. Res. SVC-217 Inspection Inv. Tech. Washington, DC 20510 Laboratory Off, of Cong. Affs. 1 - FB1 ExecSec, Room 6147 (TRIM #16/DO/3037) Off, of the Gen. - A/AD Herring Tuff Coun. Off of Intell. 1 - Ms. Beers Off. Pub. Affs Off. of Prof. Resp. Rec. Mgmt. Security Training MAIL ROOM Off. of EEOA.





Washington, D.C. 20535 September 26, 2016

Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On August 16, 2016, consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with updated copies of those documents; we have removed redactions for certain personally identifiable information. Limited redactions remain to protect the names of line agents and attorneys and other particularly sensitive information.

These materials are being provided for review by Committee Members and appropriately cleared staff in light of the Committee's oversight responsibilities. The FBI has significant concerns that further disclosure of the previously redacted identities will have a chilling effect on the public's cooperation with the FBI during ongoing and future investigations. These materials remain non-public and contain classified and other sensitive material. For that reason, these materials may not be further disseminated or disclosed, in part or in full, without obtaining the FBI's concurrence. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

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Jason V. Herring


Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Richard Shelby

- 1 Honorable Barbara Mikulski
 Ranking Member
 Committee on Appropriations
 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- 1 Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510







Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535 September 26, 2016

r 26, 2016

Honorable John Culberson
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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Acting Assistant Director

Honorable John Culberson

- 1 Honorable Michael Honda
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 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- 1 Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-30
 Washington, DC 20215



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 September 26, 2016

Honorable Jason Chaffetz Chairman Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Jason Chaffetz

- 1 Honorable Elijah E. Cummings Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
- 1 Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515



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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535 September 26, 2016

Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On August 16, 2016, consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we produce for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with updated copies of those documents; we have removed redactions for certain personally identifiable information. Limited redactions remain to protect the names of line agents and attorneys and other particularly sensitive information.

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Jason V. Herring

Sincerely,

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Robert Goodlatte

- 1 Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
 Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- 1 Office of House Security
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U.S. Department of Justice

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Washington, D.C. 20535 September 26, 2016

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Honorable Devin Nunes
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - Honorable Adam B. Schiff
 Ranking Member
 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535 September 26, 2016

Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Ron Johnson

- 1 Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member
 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- 1 Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535 September 26, 2016

Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

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Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

1 – Honorable Dianne Feinstein
 Vice Chairman
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510

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DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSIC

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535
September 26, 2016

Honorable Bob Corker Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Honorable Bob Corker

- 1 Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin Ranking Member
 Committee on Foreign Relations
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- 1 Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510

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September 26, 2016

Honorable Richard Shelby

The Chairman ...

Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

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Dep. Director

September 26, 2016

Honorable John Culberson Chairman Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On August 16, 2016, consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Conton's use of a personal e-mail server, we provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with updated copies of those documents; we have removed redactions for certain personally identifiable information. Limited redactions remain to protect the names of line agents and attorneys and other particularly sensitive information.

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

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September 26, 2016

Honorable Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Dep. Director_

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell EAD-LES Asst. Dir. Adm. Serv. 1 – Honorable Elijah E. Cummings CHS Ctrin tell. Ranking Member Ctrterrorism Crim. Inv. Committee on Oversight and Cyber Fin ance Government Reform Info. Res. U.S. House of Representatives Inspection lnv. Tech. Washington, DC 20515 Laboratory Off. of Cong. Affs. - Office of House Security Off. of the Gen. Coun. United States House of Representatives Off of Intell. HVC-301 Off. Pub. Affs. Off. of Prof. Resp. Washington, DC 20515 Rec. Memt. 1 - FBI ExecSec, Room 6147 Security - A/AD Merriog 1 - Ms. Beers

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs ALL FRI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-26-2017 BY J37J85T94 HSICG

> Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chaisman # Committee on the Judiciary **DS Phoise of Representatives** Washington DC 20515

. Chairman:

September 26, 2016



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Thank you for your continued sur

Jason V. Herring 🦸 Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

Dep. Director EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell. EAD-LES Asst. Dir 1 - Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Adm. Serv. Ranking Member CHS Cinntell. Committee on the Judiciary Cirtemorism Crim Inv. U.S. House of Representatives Cyber Finance Washington, DC 20515 Info. Res. 1 – Office of House Security Inspection Inv. Tech. United States House of Representatives Laboratory Off of Cong. Affs. HVC-301 Off, of the Gen Washington, DC 20515 Coun Off of intell. 1 - FBI ExecSec, Room 6147 Off. Pub, Affs Off. of Prof. Resp. 1 – A/AD Herring 1 - Ms. Beers Rec. Mgmt. Security Training MAIL ROOM [] Off, of EEOA

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September 26, 2016

Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On August 16, 2016, consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with updated copies of those documents; we have removed redactions for certain personally identifiable information. Limited redactions remain to protect the names of line agents and attorneys and other particularly sensitive information.

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Dep. Director CAD- Adm. CAD-CT/CI CAD-Crim	_	Sincerely,	
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September 26, 2016

Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chamber

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Dep. Director EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell. EAD-LES Adni. Serv. CIIS 1 – Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ctrintell. Ranking Member Ctrtemprism Crim. Inv. Committee on Homeland Security and Cyber Finance Governmental Affairs Info. Res. United States Senate Inspection lny, Tech. Washington, DC 20510 Laboratory Off. of Cong. Affs. 1 - Office of Senate Security Off, of the Gen. Conn. Office of the Secretary Off of Intell. United States Senate Off. Pub. Affs Off. of Prof. Resp. SVC-217 Rec. Mgmt. Security Washington, DC 20510 Training 1 - FBI ExecseopRoom 6147 Off. of EEOA 1 - A/AD Herring

Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

. 1 - Ms. Beers

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Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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September 26, 2016

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Honorable Bob Corker Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - Ms. Beers



Federal Buccau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

October 14, 2016

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Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Jason V. Herring

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Honorable Charles E. Grassley

- Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate
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- 1 Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - A/AD Herring

1 - Ms. Beers



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

October 14, 2016

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Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Jason V. Herring

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Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Richard Shelby

- 1 Honorable Barbara Mikurski
 Ranking Member
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 Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
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- 1 Office of Senate Security
 Office of the Secretary
 United States Senate
 SVC-217
 Washington, DC 20510



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

October 14, 2016

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Honorable Bob Corker

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- 1 Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

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October 14, 2016

Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Robert Goodlatte


- Honorable John Conyers
 Ranking Member
 Committee on the Judiciary
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- 1 Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

October 14, 2016



Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Jason Chaffetz

- 1 Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
 Ranking Member
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 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- 1 Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-27-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO October 14, 20%6

Honorable John Culberson Chairman Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director

Honorable John Culberson

- Honorable Michael Honda
 Rending Member
 Submittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
 and Related Agencies
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515
- 1 Office of House Security
 United States House of Representatives
 HVC-301
 Washington, DC 20515



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-27-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICO

October 14, 2016

Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Devin Nunes

I - Honorable Adam B. Schiff
 Ranking Member
 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515



Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-27-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICC Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

October 14, 2016

Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail-server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents released by investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interval arises which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited the performance of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation of the particularly sensitive information.

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Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Ron Johnson

- Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member
 Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510
- 1 Office of Senate Security Office of the Secretary United States Senate SVC-217 Washington, DC 20510



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

October 14, 2016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-27-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Honorable Richard M. Burr Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring

Acting Assistant Director

Honorable Richard M. Burr

1 - Honorable Dianne Feinstein
 Vice Chairman
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510

October 14, 2016

Honorable Richard Shelby Chairman Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's comment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Honorable Barbara Mikulski Ranking Member mommittee on Appropriations on Commerce, Justice, Science Info. Res. Agencies Inspection ln v. Tech , Senate Laboratory Off. of Cong Affs. C 20510 Off. of the Gen. Coun. Characte Security Off of Intell. Office of the Secretary Off. Pub. Affs. Off. of Prof. Resp. United States Senate Rec. Mgmi. Security SVC-217 Training Washingtons de 20510 Off. of EEOA 1 - A/AD Herring TVH 1- FBI ExecSec, Room 6147

Sincerely,

Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - Ms. Beers

October 14, 2016

Honorable Bob Corker Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:



Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we may ously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementary that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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Thank you for your continued support of the FBI.

Sincerely,

EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/C1 EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell. EAD-LES Asst. Dir.: 1 - Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin Adm. Serv. Ranking Member CHS Ctrintell. Committee on Foreign Relations Ctrtemorism Crim. Inv. United States Senate Cyber Finance Washington, DC 20510 Info. Res. 1 - Office of Senate Security Inspection Inv. Tech. Office of the Secretary Laboratory Off. of Cong. Affs. United States Senate Off. of the Gen. SVC-217 Coun. Off of Intell, Washington, DC 20510 Off. Pub. Affs. Off. of Prof. Resp. 1-FBI ExecSec, Room 6147 Rec. Memt.

Dep. Director

Security ___ Training __ Off of EEOA Jason V. Herring Acting Assistant Director Office of Congressional Affairs

1 - A/AD Herring 1 - Ms. Beers

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October 14, 2016

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 04-27-2017 BY J37J85T94 NSICG

Honorable Robert Goodlatte Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server, we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview summaries which have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited redactions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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October 14, 2016

Honorable Jason Chaffetz Chairman Committee on Oversight and Government Reform United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with Director Comey's commitment to transparency with respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary Clinton's use of a personal e-mail server—we previously provided for the Committee's review a number of documents related to this investigation. We are supplementing that production today with the remaining interview supplementaries have not previously been provided for the Committee's review. Limited reductions were made to protect the names of FBI and DOJ employees conducting the investigation and other particularly sensitive information.

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October 14, 2016

Honorable John Culberson
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science
and Related Agencies
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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October 14, 2016

Honorable Devin Nunes Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

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October 14, 2016

Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Dep. Director_

EAD-Adm. EAD-CT/CI

EAD-Crim. EAD-Intell.

EAD-LES __ Asst. Dir.; __ Adm. Serv.

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Acting Assistant Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

I - Honorable Thomas R. Carper Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
* Government Affairs
* United States Senate
* Washington DC 20510
I - Office Contact Security
Office Contact Security
United States Senate
SVC-217

Washington, DC 20510

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1 - A/AD Herring

1 - Ms. Beers

October 14, 2016

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Adm. Serv. CJIS Clinitell. Cinerronism Crint. Inv. Cyber Finance Info. Res. Inspection	l -Honorable Dianne Feinstein Vice Chairman Senate Select Committee on In United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 1-FBI ExecSec, Room 6147	1 - A/AD Herring	1 - Ms. Beers
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